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ABSTRACT 
 
Law school graduates today are increasingly freighted with Internet-accessible 
and readily searchable publication records. Can these publications create actionable 
conflicts of interest for attorneys later on? Assessing the relevance of attorney 
publications requires balancing clients’ entitlement to adequate and zealous 
representation against the rights of lawyers to express opinions and participate freely in 
social discourse. The Model Rules offer little guidance, and academics have largely 
skirted the issue. This paper presents the Publication Conflicts test, a framework for 
inquiry to assess the impact of prior publications. Then, informed by interviews with 
judges, ethics experts, law professors and practitioners, this paper presents the view that 
in general, an attorney’s prior publications lie outside the ‘bounded exclusivity’ that 




This paper will examine whether material conflicts of interest can arise from an 
attorney’s prior publications, and argue that unless the specific facts or parties involved in 
the representation are featured in a publication, the positional clash generated by 
conflicting opinions does not rise to the level of actionable conflict of interest. 
Furthermore, although attorneys may wish to disclose potentially objectionable prior 
writings to prospective clients in accordance with what they view to be good business 
practice, this paper will also argue that informed consent in general is not required in 
such cases, examine the factors defining a conflict of interest, and present the Publication 
Conflicts Test – a tripart analysis designed to draw out potential conflicts arising from 
prior publications. Increasingly, law schools are graduating young attorneys freighted 
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with an Internet-accessible and readily searchable publication record. Nonetheless, such 
publications should for the most part not create conflicts. The rights of the lawyer to 
express opinions and participate freely in social discourse should not be construed to 
transgress the carefully delineated duty of loyalty to a client.  
1. Can Prior Writings Create Conflicts of Interest? 
 
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that attorney conflicts of 
interest are grounds for disqualification,1 but it is not clear precisely what constitutes a 
conflict in most cases. The Model Rules, which practicing attorneys must know and 
obey,2 state that a current client conflict exists if “there is a significant risk that the 
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest 
of the lawyer.”3 The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers offers this 
definition: “A conflict of interest is involved if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's 
representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's 
own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a third 
person.”4 But as Professor Stephen Gillers points out, much turns on the definition of 
                                                 
1 Model Rule of Prof’l Conduct 1.7 (2001) [hereinafter Model Rules]. The Model Rules were proposed in 
1983 by the American Bar Association and have been adopted by most states, either wholly or 
substantially.  
2 “The United States Supreme Court has stated that a federal court can charge attorneys with knowledge of, 
and hold them accountable to, state ethics rules in the state where the court sits.” Thomas v. Tenneco 
Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1323 (11th Cir. 2002), citing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6, (1985) 
(“The Court of Appeals was entitled . . . to charge petitioner with the knowledge of and the duty to 
conform to the state code of professional responsibility. The uniform first step for admission to any 
federal court is admission to a state court. The federal court is entitled to rely on the attorney's knowledge 
of the state code of professional conduct applicable in that state court . . . .”). 
3 Model Rules, supra note 1, R. 1.7(a)(2). 
4 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers (2000), § 121 [hereinafter Restatement]. 
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“materially,” “adversely,” “substantial,” and “significant,” and thus, these definitions are 
inherently imprecise.5  
Whereas most conflicts that satisfy the above criteria are tangible (for instance, an 
attorney owns property that a client wishes to purchase, or already represents a client on 
the other side of the same issue), prior publications are most likely to present a positional 
conflict: a clash of opinions or beliefs between attorney and client. Some scholars have 
argued that positional conflicts are “not a per se ethical violation, but may become a 
conflict of interest if the issue is important enough to the client and there is a risk that one 
representation will materially limit the other.”6  
This paper will address the issue of prior attorney publications to examine 
whether and how these rise to the level of a material conflict of interest actionable under 
the Model Rules. Section II sets forth a hypothetical and discusses the major ethical 
issues it raises. Section III examines the rationales underlying the conflict of interest 
doctrine and presents factors useful in assessing whether a given publication presents a 
conflict; this section also covers informed consent, which can effectively immunize the 
attorney from disqualification in many conflict of interest scenarios. Section IV gathers 
these factors into the Publication Conflicts test, a ten-part assessment designed to help 
uncover potential conflicts in prior publications. Section V applies this test to the 
hypothetical. Section VI presents policy arguments why attorney publications should not 
constitute grounds for conflicts of interest, and Section VII concludes.  
 
                                                 
5 STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 185 (Aspen, 7th Ed. 
2005). 
6 Helen A. Anderson, Legal Doubletalk and the Concern with Positional Conflicts: A “Foolish 
Consistency”?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006).  
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II. PRIOR ATTORNEY PUBLICATIONS: ATTORNEY ESTOPPEL? 
1. Hypothetical: Adam and PharmaJon 
 
Adam is an attorney, working at an intellectual property law firm.7 Before 
graduating from law school, Adam completed a Ph.D. in genetics at a major research 
university. Adam personally believes that human genes should not be subject to patent 
protection in any form.8 During his near-decade of postgraduate education, Adam wrote 
several articles supporting this view to different degrees. First, while in graduate school 
Adam published a peer-reviewed scientific article (co-authored by his Ph.D. supervisor) 
revealing the high extent of genetic variability between individual humans.9 While a law 
student, Adam published an opinionated law review article in which he argued that gene 
sequences should not be protected as intellectual property because they are products of 
nature, as are any human-made duplicates or copies. Finally, before taking employment 
with the firm, Adam published a 700-word opinion piece in a national newspaper arguing 
for an end to patent protection on human gene sequences.  
Adam has since been asked to represent a large drug company, PharmaJon, 
arguing for the validity of a patent it holds for a disease assay tied to a specific human 
gene sequence. Adam approaches a colleague, a self-described ethics guru, with his 
concern. Given the current state of the law, the PharmaJon patent is probably valid; all 
policy arguments aside, Adam is well versed in the field and could represent the 
PharmaJon position well. “I try not to let my personal views affect my advocacy,” he 
                                                 
7 Here, we will not concern ourselves with imputed conflicts – those conflicts created by co-workers at a 
law firm and ascribed to the protagonist. In general, if an actionable conflict exists with respect to one 
attorney in a firm, it is possible that this conflict may disqualify the entire firm.  
8 Obviously any issue could be chosen here. In selecting the patenting of human genes, I have selected one 
that allows for a range of deeply held personal opinion and for various types of articles credibly to be 
published. Adam’s objection is to the patenting not only of the genes themselves, but also of any 
component DNA, cDNA, EST or other complementary sequences.  
9 This fact suggests that no single sequence could adequately represent the diverse range of actual human 
DNA sequences constituting a given gene. 
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says. “But if I take this case, do I need to inform PharmaJon that I’ve written in direct 
opposition to the type of thing it wants to do? What if opposing counsel cites one of my 
articles – or worse, mentions it in court? The law says gene sequences can be patented, 
though I still personally believe this should not be so. Do my past publications preclude 
me from taking this case? It certainly seems like a conflict of interest. Is it?”  
 
2. The Issues 
Publications are common, and today, often available online 
 
The problem Adam faces is an increasingly important one. Law students are 
encouraged to write (and where possible, publish) papers on issues that interest them, and 
these law review articles or notes often adopt a clear stance arguing for legal or policy 
reform. In fields such as intellectual property (IP), the leading boutique firms (as well as 
IP departments in general practice firms) routinely hire lawyers with graduate degrees in 
technical and scientific fields.10 To earn these degrees, students must typically publish at 
least one peer-reviewed article, and many publish considerably more.11 Moreover, 
students at all levels can publish opinion pieces in campus and other newspapers. Law 
firms today likely employ a substantial population of lawyers who have published one or 
more of these types of articles.  
In days past, an attorney might plausibly escape the radical views of her youth by 
omitting early and unwanted publications from her C.V. Unless she were very famous, it 
is unlikely that her colleagues in the legal profession would know of her articles or spend 
                                                 
10 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P. is a leading intellectual property law firm 
based in Washington DC. At the time of writing the Finnegan Web site listed 111 attorneys with 
advanced degrees, 44 of whom had a Ph.D., as well as 32 student associates with advanced degrees, 22 of 
whom held the Ph.D. degree. http://www.finnegan.com/lawyers/, accessed Apr. 20, 2008.  
11 This observation comes from the author’s experience; for an example of a publication requirement for the 
Ph.D. degree, see: Bulletin of Yale University, Molecular Biophysics and Biochemistry. Available online 
at http://www.yale.edu/bulletin/html/grad/mbb.html. 
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time to unearth them; in the case of newspaper opinion pieces, it is less likely still that 
potential clients or adversaries would comb print indexes or microfiche records of 
national and local papers in search of offending commentary. Today, however, the 
simplicity and ubiquity of Web publishing has led countless newspapers, journals and 
other publications to publish and archive material online, and these collections are easily 
accessible with Web search engines. As such, material published within the past decade 
is likely to be found quickly via trivial Web searches. For new articles, near-
instantaneous linking via blogs and news digests can dramatically increase the potential 
impact of a well-placed commentary, and can give even small college newspapers 
worldwide readership (if only in passing). These advances also make it difficult to 
suppress prior articles. For students in university or law school today, the material we 
publish is not only accessible worldwide via the Web, but can linger indefinitely online. 
Law schools are thus beginning to mint new attorneys already freighted with a ballast of 
published and easily accessible views, some of which may well express opinions on 
issues of interest to a future client.  
 
Published Material Presents Three Types of Potential Conflict: Factual, Legal 
and Opinion-Based 
 
When considering prior published material in light of client positions, three types 
of potential conflicts exist.  
First, the discrepancy may be factual. For instance, an attorney may have 
conducted research and published the findings in a peer-reviewed journal. Such material 
could easily be cited as factual support for a client position, and with substantial 
opportunity for disagreement on basic scientific facts, expert witnesses on either side may 
choose to invoke different academic articles addressing a given issue. It is thus 
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conceivable that, perhaps during a prior life as a graduate researcher, an attorney helped 
generate factual material that will one day be used to support the opposing side.12  
Next, the conflict could be legal in nature. An attorney who, while a law student, 
published a law review note may find that his interpretation of a particular legal issue – 
carefully developed and argued with hundreds of supporting sources – may lend support 
to the opposing side and leave him in the unenviable position of refuting his own 
thoroughgoing academic treatise.13 This is nonetheless perhaps the least worrisome of the 
three types of conflict, because lawyers are expected to marshal legal arguments as 
needed to further the interests of their client. It is neither uncommon nor prohibited for a 
lawyer to argue opposite sides of the same issue (say, the appropriateness of capital 
punishment to a given crime) for different clients and at different times in their career, 
although limitations do exist on concurrent representation of opposing interests, or 
consecutive representations involving the same parties or facts.14  
Finally, a publication could reveal personal opinions and beliefs that conflict with 
the position (ideological, political or policy) of the client. These opinions could form the 
substance of the article (as in the case of short commentaries or opinion pieces) or an 
underlying message (for instance, an ancillary argument in a longer academic paper). 
This type of conflict raises potential problems not just for the author – whose views may 
limit the clients she is willing to represent – but also for clients, who may reject an 
attorney they feel does not support their position. Other expressed opinions that may 
conflict with client views are blog postings, online message board comments, and similar 
electronic emissions captured and preserved in cyberspace. Although the longevity of 
such online postings is certainly sobering, they are unlikely to create the type of 
                                                 
12 This seemingly unlikely occurrence is in reality not so farfetched: it is very likely that this particular 
attorney would be drawn or assigned to this matter specifically because of her specialized expertise in 
that area. 
13 Potentially conflicting legal arguments could also be presented in an amicus brief.  
14 Model Rules, supra note 1, R. 1.7 and 1.9. 
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positional conflict discussed here.15 Thus, this paper will focus on opinions expressed in 
traditionally published articles and commentaries.  
Stakeholders’ varied concerns: Clients, firms, lawyers and the public 
 
Four key stakeholders in the legal process might each react differently to 
positional conflicts arising from an attorney’s prior publications.  
First, clients hire lawyers to represent their interests, and may understandably 
hesitate to retain an advocate who has publicly expressed contrary views. Even if the 
lawyer is willing to represent the client, the client may nonetheless feel that the lawyer is 
either duplicitous -- an unprincipled hired gun willing to betray his own views for a 
paycheck – or that his advocacy will be less effective because his own personal wishes 
might well be furthered if the client were to lose. Thus, the presence of contrary prior 
publications threatens the sense of client loyalty that, together with the protection of 
confidential information, undergirds many of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.16  
Second, public perception of the legal profession could suffer if lawyers are seen 
personally supporting one view while professionally arguing another. Such behavior 
might not only provoke public distaste, but also diminish the impact of the attorney’s 
prior publications: readers are unlikely to weigh seriously an impassioned commentary 
                                                 
15 Some blogs contain long and well-reasoned positions by authors, but without the weight of editorial 
approval most are unlikely to be taken seriously or cited as authority. Moreover, personal blogs and Web 
sites are under the author’s control and generally can be taken down at will. These are therefore to be 
distinguished from traditional articles, which once published are both widely accessible and outside the 
author’s control. Hiring committees search blogs and other online writings for writings by prospective 
hires, but mainly to screen for offensive content. See Eileen P. Gunn, 8 Ways to Buff Your Professional 
Image—Online, USNEWS.COM Oct. 24, 2007, 
http://www.usnews.com/articles/business/careers/2007/10/24/8-ways-to-buff-your-professional-image--
online.html. See also, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT REPORT: DIGITAL FOOTPRINTS (Dec. 
16, 2007), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Digital_Footprints.pdf. There may come a time when the 
‘total picture’ of an attorney’s online footprint generates positional conflicts that rise to the level of 
conflicts of interest under the Model Rules, but these remain beyond the scope of this paper.  
16 For an interesting discussion of the rationale underlying the conflict of interest rules, see Lee E. 
Hejmanowski, Note, An Ethical Treatment of Attorneys’ Personal Conflicts of Interest, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 881 (1993).  
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pleading reform on a given issue when its author voluntarily represents the opposing side 
in court. As such, positional conflicts arising from past publications threaten the integrity 
not only of the client representation, but also of the publications themselves.  
Third, if an attorney’s past publications potentially unsettle clients, law firms 
might avoid hiring candidates with a record of opinionated publishing for fear of 
potential clashes. Many firms already conduct extensive conflict screens, both upon 
hiring new lawyers and for each new client; if law firms were to demand ideological 
congruity between attorneys and clients, lawyers could be held to every opinion piece or 
online comment they had produced and conflicts would often occur.  
Finally, some lawyers themselves might wish to eschew clients whose views or 
interests differ dramatically from their own – particularly those views about which they 
care deeply enough to commit to writing. Such attorneys are said to display thick 
positional identity, a trait associated with so-called ‘cause lawyering.’17 These attorneys 
prefer to represent a client whose positions (or causes) align closely with their own, and 
for this group the problem of conflicting prior publications largely solves itself (assuming 
the attorney doesn’t later change her mind and renounce earlier writings). Note, however, 
that in refusing to represent clients with differing interests, these lawyers in a sense 
elevate these positional conflicts to the level of full-blown conflicts of interest; the result 
– the client must look elsewhere for representation – is equivalent to a forced withdrawal 
mandated by the Model Rules. In the extreme case, such unwillingness to represent 
clients across ideological lines could leave those with unpopular views unable to find 
legal representation.  
The hypothetical situation involving published attorney Adam and would-be 
client PharmaJon raises many interesting issues, some of which have been set forth 
                                                 
17 Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 17 (2003).  
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above. This paper will focus on whether Adam’s conundrum rises to the level of a 
conflict of interest pursuant to the Model Rules.  
 
III. RATIONALES AND IMPUTED RULES – ARE PUBLICATION-BASED CONFLICTS 
TRUE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST? 
 
Section III will cover the main rationales underlying the conflict of interest rules, 
the informed consent doctrine, and factors to consider in determining whether a given 
conflict crosses ethical boundaries. 
 
1. Three Rationales – Loyalty, Client Confidentiality, Appearance of 
Impropriety 
 
This section explores the three main rationales underlying the conflict of interest 
rules, as laid out by Lee Hejmanowski in 1993.18 
The Duty of Loyalty 
 
Loyalty to the client is a foundational principle underlying the model rules. 
Comment 1 to Model Rule 1.7 begins, “[l]oyalty and independent judgment are essential 
elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client.”19 Comment 4 to Model Rule 1.9, which 
discusses duties to former clients, states that lawyers moving between firms “must be 
reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised.”20 
Courts, too, use the language of loyalty21 to describe the lawyer’s duties: “A lay client is 
                                                 
18 Hejmanowski, supra note 16 at 899-905.  
19 Model Rules, supra note 1, R 1.7 cmt 1.  
20 Id., R 1.9 cmt 4.  
21 See, e.g., Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 232-33 (2d. Cir 1977) (“[the 
client] had an absolute right to the firm's undivided loyalty”), and Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 
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likely to doubt the loyalty of a lawyer who undertakes to oppose him in an unrelated 
matter.”22 
It is tempting initially to consider publicly expressed differences of opinion as 
‘opposition’ to the client, and thus conflate loyalty with ideological parity – but the two 
are unrelated in this context. Loyalty in the Model Rules sense is chiefly recognition of 
the fact that no lawyer can properly serve two masters.23 Thus, loyalty to the client 
dictates that lawyers should not represent competing clients, disclose confidential 
information to outside parties, or otherwise act in a way that favors a competing interest.  
Although the principle of loyalty is central to the ethical guidelines of the legal 
profession, it is also difficult to delineate in a bright-line manner and thus tricky to 
enforce. As such, courts have generally moved to focus instead on the duty to preserve 
clients’ confidential information.24  
In the hypothetical presented in Section II, the principle of loyalty is attorney 
Adam’s main stumbling block, and will play an important role in the analysis of that 
situation. It is worth remembering, however, that an attorney’s loyalty to a client is 
difficult to measure and enforce – and in the case of an attorney balancing multiple 
professional obligations against his own personal beliefs and private life, loyalty is likely 
to be measured not in absolutes but in terms of degree.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that lawyers owed their client a “duty of undivided loyalty and 
allegiance”). 
22 Jeffry v. Pounds, 67 Cal. App. 3d 6, 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
23 “No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate one, and love the other, or he will cling to one, 
and slight the other.” Matthew 6:24. This has been cited in several relevant cases. See In re W. T. Byrns, 
Inc., 260 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D. Va. 1966), Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d 
Cir. 1976), Sun Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Rashkes, 183 A. 274, 277 (N.J. Ch. 1936). 
24 Hejmanowski, supra note 16 at 899-900, citing Steven H. Goldberg, The Former Client’s 
Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REV. 227, 234-41 
(1987).  
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The Duty to Preserve Confidential Client Information 
 
Confidentiality of client information is a key ethical precept. It is widely known 
(‘attorney-client privilege’ is routinely invoked on popular television programs) and 
protected by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.25 The Model Rules address client 
confidence in the preamble26 and devote several rules to its discussion.27 The Restatement 
of The Law Governing Lawyers takes a slightly more liberal view than the Model Rules, 
permitting certain disclosures so long as they do not adversely affect the material 
interests of the client.28  Confidentiality is also a main ground for imputed conflicts of 
interest among lawyers at the same firm.29 
Despite its central position underpinning the principles of legal ethics, however, 
client confidentiality is unlikely to be a driving factor in the hypothetical situation 
presented above. Prior publications cannot divulge information a current client would 
deem confidential, and there is no reason to assume an attorney who has published in the 
past would be any more likely to divulge client information than one who had not. 
Confidentiality is chiefly a concern in cases of lawyers representing multiple clients 
whose interests conflict,30 whether concurrent31 or consecutive.32 As such, this paper will 
not focus on this issue, though it is of course central to many other conflict of interest 
cases.  
                                                 
25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)3. 
26 “A lawyer should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as 
disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.” Model Rules, 
supra note 1, Pmbl [4]. 
27 Id. at R 1.6, R 1.7(c), R. 1.8(b).  
28 Restatement, supra note 4, at §60(1)(a).  
29 Model Rules, supra note 1, R 1.10. See also Id. at R 1.8(k) and R 1.9b. 
30 This is a common situation, covered extensively in legal ethics casebooks. See generally Gillers, supra 
note 5.  
31 Model Rules, supra note 1, R 1.8.  
32 Id., R 1.9.  
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The Appearance-of-Impropriety Standard 
 
Lawyers are integral to the justice system, and it is important to maintain public 
confidence in the fairness of this legal system.33 This is reflected in Canon 9 of the Model 
Code, a precursor to the modern Model Rules, titled “A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the 
Appearance of Professional Impropriety.”34  
An obvious problem with prohibiting the appearance of impropriety is the 
subjective nature of the assessment. There are two main standards by which the 
appearance of impropriety is assessed: the perspective of the client, and that of the 
general public.35 Both, however, require courts to “perform the inherently subjective task 
of considering how uneasy” the public or former clients feel.36 Consequently, courts have 
moved away from disqualifying lawyers on these grounds37 and instead focus on whether 
representing a given client is likely to lead to inequity.38 The Model Rules as well have 
moved away from this standard by explicitly laying out the lawyer’s duties to former 
clients in Rule 1.9 and eschewing the language of Canon 9. (Interestingly, it is possible 
that removing rules in this manner may do more to preserve public perception of lawyers 
than do the rules themselves. One scholar has argued that public perception of 
impropriety is in effect reflexive: If we do away with the rules against positional conflicts 
of interest, the public will perhaps not think worse of lawyers who engage in them.39) 
The appearance of impropriety could nonetheless be an important consideration in 
the case of an attorney’s prior publications. In the extreme case, a high-profile attorney 
who previously advocated a position in a high-circulation newspaper might well suffer a 
                                                 
33 Id., Pmbl. 
34 Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility (1983), Canon 9. 
35 Hejmanowski, supra note 16, at 903.  
36 Id. at 904. 
37 Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the “appearance of 
impropriety” analysis in favor of a confidential disclosure analysis). 
38 Hejmanowski, supra note 16, at 904.  
39 Anderson, supra note 6, at 5.  
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loss of credibility if she then advocated for the other side in a case that was also widely 
covered. On the other hand, positional conflicts stemming from prior publications may 
not qualify as impropriety at all. Hejmanowksi suggests “more people would presumably 
find an attorney’s actions to be improper when the attorney opposes a client to protect a 
large economic interest than when the attorney advocates views through public speech 
that oppose a client’s interests on an issue,”40 while Anderson goes still further to argue 
that positional conflicts are not true conflicts of interest and should not be the subject of 
ethical prohibitions at all.41  
Conceptually, the appearance of impropriety presupposes actual perception of 
improper behavior. The public is unlikely to perceive such behavior unless the case (or 
the prior writing) is particularly well known; and while the client is likely aware of the 
attorney’s behavior, they are unlikely to be concerned with appearances as such and more 
with the underlying impropriety itself. This in turn is better dealt with through the ethical 
principles of loyalty and confidentiality, discussed above. As such, the appearance of 
impropriety is a useful shorthand that upon inquiry distills to other component 
rationales.42  
2. The Informed Consent Vaccine  
 
Although the Model Rules are vague in setting out precisely what constitutes a 
conflict of interest, they do explain that a willing client through informed consent can 
waive most conflicts.43 Thus, even if an attorney’s prior publications rise to the level of a 
                                                 
40 Hejmanowski, supra note 16, at 898.  
41 Anderson, supra note 6, at 5.  
42 Hejmanowski, supra note 16, at 898. 
43 A client through informed consent (sometimes with a written consent requirement) can waive: Its right to 
attorney-client confidentiality, Model Rules supra note 1, R 1.6 (a); a conflict of interest between current 
clients, Id., R 1.7 (b) 4, so long as the attorney does not represent both sides in a single transaction, Id., R 
1.7 (b) 3, and believes he can provide “competent and diligent representation,” Id., R 1.7 (b) 1; a conflict 
arising when a lawyer acquires or possesses a financial interest adverse to a client, Id., R 1.8 (a) 3, uses 
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prohibited conflict of interest, this conflict could be waived by obtaining informed 
consent. Some conflicts cannot be waived, but these are fairly egregious and are clearly 
set forth in the Model Rules.44  
At first glance, it might seem as though law firms – which, through their Web 
sites, routinely disclose each attorney’s prior publications – would not need to obtain 
separate consent on this matter, since clients could reasonably be assumed to be familiar 
with (and to consent to) the public biographies of their attorneys. However, this ‘caveat 
emptor’ approach does not satisfy the Model Rules definition of informed consent, which 
is “the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has 
communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and 
reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”45 Thus, to obtain 
satisfactory informed consent to a problematic prior publication, a lawyer must explicitly 
and affirmatively explain not only its existence but also its relevance to the matter at 
hand, including any difference of position and the various ways it may weaken the 
representation.46 The lawyer may also of course present her own opinion on the matter, 
arguing why the publication is not relevant or why the conflict should be waived.   
Since informed consent effectively immunizes the lawyer against disqualification 
on account of prior writings, it appears to be an effective tool to combat such conflicts. 
Rather than engage in complicated inquiries as to whether a particular attorney’s corpus 
of prior publications amount to a conflict of interest with respect to a given 
                                                                                                                                                 
information related to a representation to the disadvantage of the client, Id., R 1.8 (b), accepts 
compensation for representation from someone other than the client, Id., R 1.8 (f) 1, aggregates claims for 
multiple clients, Id., R 1.8 (g), represents another client in the same or a substantially related matter in 
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of a former client, Id., R 1.9, or accepts 
prospective clients with competing interests to current clients, Id., R 1.18 (d) 1. 
44 Id., R 1.7(b) 1, 3.  
45 Id., R 1.0 (e). The comments to this rule explain that the lawyer must make “reasonable efforts” to ensure 
the client possesses information “reasonably adequate” to make an informed decision. Id., R 1.0 cmt 5.  
46 See E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 398 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (holding that attorney 
disclosure must be explicit for informed consent to be valid).  
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representation, an attorney can simply disclose her prior writings, explain their positions 
and their relevance to the representation, and put the matter to the client.  
However, although informed consent can immunize an attorney against positional 
conflicts presented by prior publications, and many believe that seeking such consent in 
this situation is good business practice,47 it is not a panacea: Clients may not appreciate 
paying large sums to a law firm only to have its individual lawyers turn against them;48 it 
may be difficult for the client to understand fully the possible ramifications of the 
potential conflict, even after being informed; moreover, attorneys might not seek consent 
and clients might not grant it, and in either case it is useful for attorneys to know where 
they stand in situations where it is not sought.  
3. Factors Defining Conflicts of Interest 
 
Section I outlined the difficulty in pinning down precisely what constitutes an 
actionable conflict of interest, either under the Model Rules or the Restatement definition. 
This subsection presents a list of factors to consider when evaluating a given positional 
conflict, to ascertain whether it rises to the level of a prohibited conflict of interest. No 
hard and fast rule exists for these factors; rather, “the application of conflict rules is a 
matter of judgment and degree.”49 Others have presented different lists of factors to 
consider when weighing whether a particular situation constitutes a conflict of interest, 
including, for example, the attorney’s economic and property interests and the 
                                                 
47 Interview with Judge Guido Calabresi, 2d. Cir, in New Haven, CT (Apr. 8, 2008); E-mail from Stephen 
Gillers, Emily Kempin Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, to author (31 March 
2008, 18:19 ET) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with James Henderson, Frank B. Ingersoll 
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School (Apr. 14, 2008); Interview with Anthony Kronman, Sterling 
Professor of Law, Yale Law School, in New Haven, CT (Apr. 17, 2008); Telephone Interview with 
Jerome Kurtz, Former Professor, New York University School of Law (Apr. 7, 2008). 
48 Hejmanowski, supra note 16, at 909. 
49 E-mail from Stephen Gillers, supra note 47.  
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involvement of the attorney’s relatives.50 The factors listed here have been chosen for 
their applicability to the issue of conflicts arising from an attorney’s prior publications 
and are not meant to be exhaustive for all potential conflicts.  
Timing 
 
Assuming the attorney’s prior publications express opinions or facts contrary to 
the position of the client, the timing of those publications is relevant. If a senior lawyer 
published the material many years before – for instance, while an undergraduate – then 
he will find it easier to distance himself from the views expressed therein.51 Further, 
publications from a previous occupation are less likely to raise suspicion; for example, it 
is common for attorneys to move from positions in government to private practice (and 
vice versa) and as a consequence to adopt near-orthogonal views. Attorneys ‘change 
sides’ in this manner quite frequently, moving from criminal prosecution to defense, say, 
or from government environmental enforcement to private practice environmental 
defense. The fact that a new hire previously has been on the other side of these legal 
issues is generally seen as a strong positive by firms and, presumably, by clients as well. 
Firms should thus be willing to accept a certain degree of conflicting publication from the 
past, particular when the attorney in question is made even more attractive and effective 
by her prior exposure to the opposing camp.   
Recent publications may raise more suspicion, calling into question the attorney’s 
dedication to the client’s cause. The extreme case would be the attorney publicly taking a 
policy position adverse to that of a client that the lawyer is currently representing. 
According to the Restatement, even this is permissible so long as it does not “materially 
                                                 
50 Hejmanowski, supra note 16, at 891-898. 
51 Interview with Guido Calabresi, supra note 47.  
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and adversely affect the lawyer's representation of the client in the matter,”52 again 
invoking imprecise terms. Who is to say whether publishing an op-ed in a major 
newspaper adversely affects the lawyer’s representation? The client, the public, the court 
and the lawyer himself might all have different views on this. The Model Rules are 
somewhat clearer, establishing a bright line rule that prohibits an attorney from acquiring 
an adverse financial or property interest after he has agreed to represent the client, unless 
that client consents.53  
The timing of conflicting publications is thus an important factor that can either 
mitigate or aggravate the severity of a potential conflict. According to the Restatement, it 
is apparent that the expression of general policy views unlikely to materially or adversely 
affect a client are always permitted; however, to do so might still make poor business 
sense and could be discouraged or prohibited by law firms.  
In summary, the key questions to consider about timing of a publication are (1) 
whether the publication occurred before the attorney agreed to represent a given client 
(either in the offending matter, or in general); (2) whether the publication was a product 
of a different employment situation (for instance, produced while a student, or working at 
a government office); (3) whether the attorney still adheres to the conflicting viewpoint, 
and if (4) intervening events have rendered the views or facts themselves obsolete.  
Relevance of Subject Matter 
 
A second key factor in determining whether prior publications create a conflict of 
interest is the closeness of their subject matter to the issues of importance to the client. 
Today, ethical guidelines prohibit attorneys from representing two clients 
                                                 
52 Restatement, supra note 4, §125 cmt (e).  
53 Model Rules, supra note 1, R 1.8(a). 
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simultaneously54 if those representations will be directly adverse55 or if there is a 
significant risk that either of those representations will materially hinder the other.56 The 
same assessment – degree of opposition, and risk of material hindrance – can be applied 
to the subject matter of an attorney’s publications.  
In general, the closer the situation presented in the publication to a client’s fact 
pattern or position, the greater the opportunity for legitimate conflict. Situations likely to 
generate conflicts might include a prior publication expressing an opinion about a 
specific party (for example, a commentary decrying the practices of a certain 
corporation), or dealing with the same or very similar facts (e.g., a law review article 
arguing that a specific class of patent should be ruled invalid). Of course, even if the 
published subject matter overlaps with the client’s interests, the publication must usually 
still advocate opposing views for the conflict to emerge.  
If the publication is factual in nature (a peer-reviewed scientific journal article, for 
instance, or the findings of a social science survey) and the facts presented therein are 
central to the case, there is a risk the attorney may be called as a witness or to provide 
expert testimony. If this risk is substantial the attorney could be disqualified under Model 
Rule 3.7, due to the inherent conflict of interest created when an advocate is called to 
deliver factual testimony. These facts need not oppose the client’s position – indeed, the 
lawyer would be disqualified if called as a witness for either side.  
If the publication presents the attorney’s own opinion, then the degree or strength 
of opinion and its deviation from societal norms is a relevant factor as well. Some issues 
                                                 
54 This was not always so. In 1872, lawyer Matthew Hale Carpenter argued contradictory interpretations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause to the Supreme Court; that court used the 
decision in one (the Slaughter-House Cases, in which he prevailed) as precedent for their ruling in the 
next (Bradwell, where his client lost). See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) and Bradwell v. 
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873). Arguing both sides of an issue in this manner is also consistent with the thin 
positional identity ideal espoused by Spaulding. See Spaulding, supra note 17. 
55 Model Rules, supra note 1, R 1.7(a)1. 
56 Id., R 1.7(a)2. 
No Such Thing as Attorney Estoppel / Seringhaus / August 2008  21
are culturally divisive and regularly debated, such as desired election outcomes, 
legislative reform and so on – uniformity on these issues is not expected, and clients are 
likely to be tolerant of differing views as an upshot of the democratic process. 
Nonetheless, other issues are so divisive (for instance, stem cell research, abortion or 
Intelligent Design) that proponents or detractors may be unwilling to be represented by 
an attorney who has published conflicting beliefs. An attorney obviously need not share 
or adopt the client’s position on politicized issues,57 but in rare cases where those matters 
are themselves at issue, differences may well rise to the level of a material hindrance if 
the attorney has publicly expressed opposing views.  
The relevance to the client’s position of issues raised in the prior publication also 
plays a role in assessing the severity of potential conflicts. For instance, an attorney may 
have published a strongly opinionated legal commentary urging reform of a particular 
procedural detail that is manifest in the client’s case; if this detail is peripheral or 
incidental this prior publication is unlikely to present a material conflict.  
In summary, with respect to ascertaining conflicts of interest, relevant inquiries 
about the subject matter of prior publications are: (1) whether specific parties or facts at 
issue are mentioned; (2) the centrality of the issue to the client’s legal matters; (3) 
whether factual material is presented that may thrust the attorney into the role of witness; 
and (4) how strongly opinionated it is, and how much tolerance for division there is on 
that issue.  
Freedom of expression and participatory rights 
 
An attorney’s relationship with a single client rarely constitutes the entirety of his 
professional existence, let alone his personal life. Professor Anthony Kronman described 
                                                 
57 Nor does representing a client suggest an endorsement: “A lawyer's representation of a client … does not 
constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.” Model 
Rules, supra note 1, R 1.2(b).  
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the lawyer’s advocacy for any individual client as “bounded exclusivity,” a zealous 
devotion to the client’s cause within carefully prescribed limits.58 These bounds protect 
the basic societal rights of free expression that lawyers share with other citizens. And 
although mandatory recusal from a case due to a speech-related conflict of interest would 
preserve the lawyer’s right to free speech above her right to represent a given client (that 
is to say, it is the client representation, not the speech, that is prohibited), such recusal 
would also indirectly discourage dissenting speech by attorneys unwilling to sacrifice 
future clients. Rule-makers should be mindful of such unwelcome incentives – after all, 
depending upon the issue, attorneys may be among the most qualified to speak out – and 
should avoid defining conflicts of interest so broadly that they impinge upon attorney 
speech.  
By limiting actionable conflicts of interest to those that adversely and materially 
impact the client, the Model Rules properly circumscribe the bounds of the attorney’s 
loyalty to the client and define the ambit of this ‘bounded exclusivity.’ Staking out the 
other side of the line, the authors of the Restatement list forms of expression that do not 
constitute conflicts and in which attorneys may freely engage.59 As mentioned 
previously, Model Rule 1.2(b) explicitly reminds readers that attorneys are not required 
to personally espouse their client’s views.60 As Hejmanowski puts it, “a prohibited 
conflict of interest does not necessarily develop when a lawyer states opinions that differ 
from the views that would best serve the client’s interests.”61 When assessing a potential 
conflict of interest, it is therefore important to balance client loyalty against the attorney’s 
right to freedom of expression, the social good stemming from attorney contributions to 
public opinion, the public’s right to information and the attorney’s participatory rights. 
                                                 
58 Interview with Anthony Kronman, supra note 47.  
59 Restatement, supra note 4, § 125 illus. 5. 
60 Model Rules, supra note 1, R 1.2(b).  
61 Hejmanowski, supra note 16 at 894.  
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The correct balance favors attorney speech slightly over client interests, highlighting the 
centrality of social participation and free speech.62 In other words, a client can choose 
another attorney more easily than the lawyer can find another means to express his views 
on the matter in question.  
Thus, when weighing attorney freedom of expression and participatory rights 
against the duty of loyalty to the client, the central questions with respect to prior 
publications are (1) does the publication lie within the bounded exclusivity the client 
rightly expects, and (2) does the publication express the attorney’s view on an issue of 
great public concern where lawyer speech should be particularly carefully protected? 
 
IV. THE PUBLICATION CONFLICTS TEST 
 
This section proposes a tri-part test to assist in determining whether prior 
publications amount to an actionable conflict of interest under the Model Rules for a 
given representation. The Publication Conflicts test compiles and condenses the factors 
presented in Section III.  
The Publication Conflicts Test 
 
(1) Timing. Is the publication recent enough to conflict meaningfully with the 
client’s interests?  
a. Have intervening events (for example, scientific progress or changes to the 
law or public policy) rendered the publication less relevant? 
b. Did the publication occur before the attorney agreed to represent the 
client?  
                                                 
62 See Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that abortion is a matter “of great 
public concern” and holding that a government attorney had a right to voice concern although her 
position opposed that of her employer, the California Department of Health Services).  
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c. Was the publication the product of a previous employment situation where 
differing views are to be expected (for instance, produced while a student, 
or working in government)?  
d. Has the attorney since rejected the conflicting viewpoint? 
(2) Relevance. How much overlap is there between the publication and the issues at 
stake in the representation? 
a. Are specific parties or facts at issue mentioned in the publication?  
b. Is the issue central to the client’s legal matters? 
c. If the publication presents factual material, might any material presented 
require the attorney to assume the role of witness? 
d. If the publication presents the attorney’s opinions, is the opinion clearly 
opposed to the client’s position, and is this an issue for which division is 
expected or often tolerated?  
(3) Free Expression. Balancing the rights of the attorney to express views and 
participate privately in society against the professional obligation of client loyalty. 
a. Was the publication produced in a professional capacity, and does it 
violate the ‘bounded exclusivity’ owed to the client? 
b. Does the publication express concern a matter of great public importance? 
 
Affirmative answers to (1) and negative answers to (2) will tend to decrease the 
chance that the publication represents an actionable conflict; for (3), a negative answer to 
part (a) and an affirmative answer to part (b) will tend to further decrease this chance of 
conflict.  
This test is far from definitive – it is easy to envision scenarios in which certain 
factors override others, and so on. It is intended to provide a framework for attorneys, law 
firms and clients to evaluate the potential risk of conflict, and moreover as a basic 
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checklist for attorneys seeking informed consent from clients with respect to prior 
publications. Because informed consent requires explicit disclosure of risk to satisfy the 
provisions of the Model Rules,63 this test should provide useful guidelines for such 
disclosures.  
Before applying the test to the hypothetical presented in this paper, it is 
informative to apply the principles of the Publication Conflicts test to a similar conflict 
situation that is directly addressed in the Restatement.  
Speaking out in public in a manner inconsistent with a client’s views is perhaps 
the closest analog to publishing conflicting opinions, the only difference being the 
medium of expression. The Restatement specifically addresses the former situation and 
states, “a lawyer may publicly take personal positions on controversial issues without 
regard to whether the positions are consistent with those of some or all of the lawyer's 
clients. Consent of the lawyer's clients is not required”64 (emphasis added). This 
reasoning is analogous to part (3)(a) of the Publication Conflicts analysis, in that it 
distinguishes between the lawyer’s personal and professional life, and part 3(b) in its 
requirement that issues be controversial in nature; the Restatement goes on to say that 
“[l]awyers usually represent many clients, and professional detachment is one of the 
qualities a lawyer brings to each client,”65 again reflecting the ‘bounded exclusivity’ 
concept set forth in 3(a). The Restatement authors qualify this by noting that the lawyer 
cannot publicly assume a policy position adverse to a client “that the lawyer is currently 
representing” if doing so would “materially and adversely affect the lawyer's 
representation of the client,”66 which invokes both (1) timing – most directly 1(b), since 
the other three factors are not applicable in this case – and (2) relevance (which breaks 
                                                 
63 E.F. Hutton & Co., 305 F. Supp. at 398. 
64 Restatement, supra note 4, § 125 cmt (e).  
65 Id.  
66 Id. 
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the ‘material and adverse’ requirement into four component factors). Analysis guided by 
the Publication Conflicts factors thus yields the accepted Restatement view of this 
situation, while the test’s ten sub-factors offer enhanced specificity to deal with the 
specific peculiarities of publication as a medium for expression.  
With the applicability of the Publication Factors test demonstrated on this 
analogous situation, we turn now to apply it to the hypothetical presented in Section II.  
 
V. ADAM’S DILEMMA: APPLYING THE PUBLICATION CONFLICTS ANALYSIS 
 
How should Adam proceed? Adam has expressed strong views against the 
patenting of human genes in two papers (an opinion piece published shortly before 
joining the firm, and a law review note published while a law student) and has presented 
factual information that might bear on the issue in a third (the peer-reviewed article 
published while in graduate school).  
Timing. Adam still espouses the viewpoint presented in these three papers.67 
However, each paper represents a product either of previous studies, or Adam’s personal 
opinion. Adam might also investigate whether intervening changes in law, policy or 
scientific research have stripped his publications of meaning, which would further 
decrease the likelihood of conflict. On the whole, the timing of these papers diminishes 
the chance of meaningful conflict.  
Relevance. Adam must gauge the relevance of the subject matter of this paper to 
the PharmaJon representation to the best of his ability (he likely will not know all details 
of the case before agreeing to represent the company). If any paper specifically mentions 
                                                 
67 It is possible that this conflict of (current) views may constitute a traditional positional conflict; this 
could be dealt with according to the Model Rules. This conflict will not likely affect the representation, 
however, because the Model Rules and the Restatement give attorneys broad latitude to hold and to some 
degree express views contrary to a given client’s interests. See Model Rules, supra note 1, R 1.2.  
No Such Thing as Attorney Estoppel / Seringhaus / August 2008  27
PharmaJon, a gene that PharmaJon has patented, or any other party or fact directly 
applicable to the case, Adam should seek informed consent and the advice of outside 
counsel to assess whether these facts present a conflict of interest. If the facts presented in 
the peer-reviewed article prove central to the dispute, Adam might be asked to testify to 
their validity, and the incompatibility of the advocate and witness roles would disqualify 
him from representing PharmaJon.68 (To avoid disqualification, Adam might contact his 
co-authors: many research papers in basic science are co-authored by students and 
research supervisors. Adam’s former Ph.D. supervisor is an obvious choice to testify to 
the validity of the facts should this prove necessary, potentially leaving Adam free to 
represent PharmaJon.) Finally, Adam might also note that, while his positions are indeed 
opposed to those PharmaJon would have him argue, gene patenting and the ownership of 
life are contentious issues and some social division is expected.  
Free Expression. Adam’s papers were produced outside his professional capacity 
as a lawyer, so they exist outside the ‘bounded exclusivity’ to which PharmaJon or other 
clients are entitled. While certain personal activities (for instance, buying real estate or 
entering into business deals) can create conflicts, policy-based speech is a protected 
societal freedom that attorneys must work to preserve. Adam might also argue that 
although the law may currently permit the patenting of human gene sequences, this is an 
oversight of great social importance and his ability to lobby for change while working 
within the current law should not be curbed.  
Adam’s three papers are unlikely to present meaningful conflicts or prevent him 
from representing PharmaJon. He should ensure that the specific facts and parties at issue 
in the representation are not discussed in the papers, since this would increase the 
possibility of conflict; but in general, policy-based speech exists outside the ‘bounded 
                                                 
68 Model Rules, supra note 1, R 3.7. See also, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 517 (U.S. 1947) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (on the incompatibility of the roles of advocate and witness).  
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exclusivity’ attorneys owe their clients, and barring problematic overlaps in either timing 
or relevance, Adam need not be concerned. He is free to disclose the papers to 
PharmaJon in keeping with good business practice, but this is not ethically required.  
 
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: WHY PRIOR PUBLICATIONS SHOULD NOT 
PRODUCE CONFLICTS 
 
It has been argued that lawyering is a role for which sincerity is not required.69 It 
may not even be desirable, since the idea of the lawyer arguing for positions he does not 
personally believe in is an established one: “A lawyer is required to be disingenuous. He 
is required to make statements as well as arguments which he does not believe in … his 
freedom from the strict bonds of veracity and of the law are the two chief assets of the 
profession.”70 The Model Rules seem also to favor this approach.71  
Nevertheless, clients may reasonably expect their lawyers not to take positions 
that hinder their ability to effectively advocate the client’s case – or to damage their 
credibility in the representation -- so the Model Rules establish a perimeter that defines 
the ‘bounded exclusivity’ attorneys owe their clients. Within these bounds, the attorney is 
zealously and loyally devoted to the client’s cause; outside these bounds, the attorney’s 
duties to other clients and to herself take precedence. The lawyer’s own publications, in 
particular opinionated articles or other forms of policy-based argument, should be 
protected and kept clearly outside the bounds of her duty to the client.  
Clients are not entitled to a lawyer who endorses their views wholesale, but rather 
to one who in a professional and detached manner can provide a service: to advocate the 
                                                 
69 Spaulding, supra note 17, at 11.  
70 Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 9 (1951).  
71 Model Rules, supra note 1, R 1.2(a), 1.2(b); see also Spaulding, supra note 17 at 17-18, 20, 47-48, and 
Anderson, supra note 6 at 4.  
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client’s case. (When the client’s personal struggle becomes the lawyer’s as well, we 
approach cause lawyering, which is an issue for another review.72) 
The client’s choice of counsel may be motivated by the attorney’s prior 
experience in the very area in which she published. A client who selects a particular 
attorney for her expertise in a particular field should perhaps expect that she might also 
have expressed her own views on it. A client may be willing to retain the international 
expert on tax shelters, for instance, despite the fact that the attorney’s own views on tax 
shelters lean toward their abolition.  
Such tolerance of attorney expression is positive: the public good is not served by 
discouraging policy input from those best qualified to offer it. If clients or law firms were 
to favor attorneys who kept silent on policy matters – or if the Model Rules were revised 
to disqualify lawyers who spoke out by classifying this as a conflict of interest – this 
would create an incentive for experts in a given field to keep quiet.73  
Similarly, peer-reviewed factual articles should not be employed by opposing 
counsel to coerce lawyers to appear as witnesses, thereby disqualifying them. On the 
whole, clients are likely to benefit if experts choose to pursue legal careers after extensive 
education or time spent in research; as a policy matter, therefore, this path should not be 
discouraged by complicating the legal careers of those who have carried out and 
published scientific studies in past. 
If prior opinion publications are seen as tipping the attorney’s ideological hand, 
clients may erroneously gravitate toward attorneys who never publicly have expressed 
their views. However, an absence of opposing articles on the attorney’s C.V. is of course 
                                                 
72 See generally, Spaulding, supra note 17, and Anderson, supra note 6.  
73 The Restatement makes this point explicitly in a comment: “Resolution of many public questions is 
benefited when independent legal minds are brought to bear on them. For example, if tax lawyers 
advocating positions about tax reform were obliged to advocate only positions that would serve the 
positions of their present clients, the public would lose the objective contributions to policy making of 
some persons most able to help.” Restatement, supra note 4, § 125 cmt (e).  
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no guarantee that he shares the client’s view on any matter. By selecting only 
unpublished attorneys, the client risks retaining an advocate with the same positional 
conflict, but who, for whatever reason, was unable or unwilling to publish it. Thus, by 
selecting against attorneys with prior publications, the client is in effect only selecting 
against a skill – persuasive writing – that is distinct from attorney viewpoints and, in 
general, desirable. Clients would fare better by seeking attorneys with thin positional 
identity (that is, those willing effectively to advocate positions regardless of ideological 
parity) and a host of well-written articles, as opposed to selecting for attorneys with 
sparse publication records and unknown ideological bent.  
Of course, even if the client is satisfied that the lawyer will advocate its position 
wholeheartedly, the risk remains that opposing counsel or the court will cite or bring up 
the lawyer’s prior publications, possibly embarrassing the client and the attorney and, in 
extreme cases, perhaps materially weakening the representation. This threat of 
humiliation – conceptually similar to the appearance of impropriety standard, mentioned 
above – is the main potential pitfall that remains after the lawyer and client have decided 
to proceed with the representation.  
Steven Rosenblum, a partner in the corporate department of the law firm 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz, and author of several articles on mergers and 
acquisitions and corporate governance, said in an interview that it is not uncommon for 
opposing counsel to cite a lawyer’s previous work, but that “lawyers tend to find this 
annoying, and I think most judges find it annoying. Unless it’s directly on point – same 
parties, same facts – it’s a game of ‘gotcha’ that really doesn’t resonate.”74 Another 
practitioner stated that in his experience, if a lawyer tried to embarrass opposing counsel 
by referencing some prior personal viewpoint, the judge would probably “shoot them 
                                                 
74 Telephone interview with Steven Rosenblum, Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz (Apr 21 2008).  
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down.”75 Judge Guido Calabresi, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, said in an 
interview that if such a situation were to occur, it would not influence his decision 
because the lawyer’s personal beliefs are not relevant to the client’s position.76 James 
Lane Buckley, who served as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
from 1985 through 1996, said he had never heard a case where this situation occurred.77  
Perhaps the ultimate, worst-case manifestation of prior publication conflict is the 
situation wherein a judge, in handing down the decision, incorporates a citation to the 
lawyer’s prior opposing work. In this case, the attorney’s prior publications could rightly 
be said materially to have impacted the case, inasmuch as they are reflected in the judicial 
opinion. This very situation occurred in Liriano v. Hobart, wherein Judge Calabresi cited 
prior work by James Henderson, a prominent torts scholar and lawyer in the case, when 
handing down the decision (which ruled against Henderson’s side).78 This was done in 
the context of jest among old friends, however, and the apparent conflict did not 
influence the outcome.79  
Socially, the dearth of law review and opinion articles written by practicing 
lawyers is perhaps a greater hazard than the occasional positional conflict. In general, 
practicing attorneys ought not fret about their personal positions being used against them, 
since courts clearly do not recognize ‘attorney estoppel.’ 
                                                 
75 Interview with a partner in a major intellectual property law firm who requested to remain unnamed 
(Mar. 4 2008).  
76 Interview with Guido Calabresi, supra note 47.  
77 E-mail message from James Lane Buckley, former judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
(Apr. 9 2008) (on file with author). 
78 Judge Calabresi cited an article by attorney Henderson: “But to state the issue that way would be to 
misunderstand the complex functions of warnings. As two distinguished torts scholars have pointed out, a 
warning can do more than exhort its audience to be careful. It can also affect what activities the people 
warned choose to engage in. See James A. Henderson, Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in 
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L.REV. 265, 285 (1990).” Liriano v. 
Hobart, 170 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 1999). 
79 Interview with Guido Calabresi, supra note 47; telephone interview with James Henderson, supra note 
47.  
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Good faith use of an opponent’s prior writing 
 
A lawyer may cite opposing counsel’s prior work, if that work is relevant and 
persuasive.80 Each side is equally entitled to cite various authorities, and if one of these 
happens to be written by a lawyer for the other side, this should not per se preclude its 
use. This situation may well put the affected lawyer in the unenviable position of 
distinguishing or arguing against his own prior writing, but this is conceptually no 
different from distinguishing a key case raised by the opposition. It should be noted 
however that the court should not tolerate lawyers deliberately invoking marginally 
related work to embarrass or trip up opposing counsel. If this is done with intent to 
disqualify the affected lawyer, courts should be particularly careful: the strategic use of 
motions to disqualify is discouraged.81  
Where writing may create conflicts 
 
Although it may be ethically permissible, many law firms will not publish articles 
that undercut prominent positions the firm has assumed for clients – for instance, 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz, the firm which invented the ‘poison pill’ response to 
corporate takeover, would not publish an article questioning the legality of the 
approach.82 This reflects the good business practice of keeping customers happy, more 
than concern over ethical conflicts. However, an attorney who had previously and 
individually written material opposing that position would not be disqualified from the 
hiring process.83  
                                                 
80 Interview with Guido Calabresi, supra note 47.  
81 FDIC v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1315 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that to bring trivial 
conflicts to the attention of the court “suggests not so much a conscientious professional concern for the 
profession and the client of the opposing counsel as a tactic designed to delay and harass.”).  
82 Telephone interview with Steven Rosenblum, supra note 74.  
83 Id.  
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A situation in which prior writings matter a great deal is in the case of expert 
witnesses, whose testimony is grounded in their expertise. Expert witnesses may be 
lawyers by trade, but they are retained in this capacity not as advocates but to testify to 
the validity of certain facts or positions. As such, their publications are of paramount 
importance, and lawyers retained as expert witnesses can expect to have their prior 
writings carefully combed for potential conflicts.84  
Lawyers acting as legal commentators, a role that rose to prominence during the 
O.J. Simpson trial, may also discover that their prior writings create subtle suggestions of 
bias, real or not. In the wake of the Simpson trial, scholars set out to forge a code of 





Everyone interviewed for this paper – judges, ethics experts, law professors and 
practitioners alike – agreed that in general, an attorney’s prior publications do not amount 
to meaningful conflicts of interest. Attorneys should ensure that the specific facts and 
parties at issue in the representation are not discussed in the papers; but in general, an 
attorney’s publications should lie outside the ‘bounded exclusivity’ that attorneys owe 
their clients. While it may be good business practice to disclose such publications to 
potential clients, the ethics guidelines do not demand it. 
Still, there is no clear instruction on how to deal with prior publications in the 
Model Rules. Rather, the rules offer very general parameters with which to assess 
                                                 
84 Telephone Interview with James Henderson, supra note 47; Interview with Anthony Kronman, supra 
note 47.  
85 Erwin Chemerinsky and Laurie Levenson, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the Implications for the 
Criminal Justice System: The Ethics of Being a Commentator, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1303 (1996).  
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potential conflicts, further complicated because, as Professor Gillers notes, “the 
application of conflict rules is a matter of judgment and degree.”86 When assessing 
positional conflicts, it can seem as though the answer is always ‘it depends’ – but with 
the Publication Conflicts analysis, at least we have some idea what it depends upon.  
The Publication Conflicts factors provide a framework for inquiry and can guide 
analysis of potential publication conflicts by identifying the relevant questions and 
highlighting areas wherein conflicts are most likely.  
 
                                                 
86 E-mail from Stephen Gillers, supra note 47.  
